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An Equilibrium Pricing for OTC Derivatives with 
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Abstract
  In this article, we propose an equilibrium pricing rule for the contingent claims by 
applying the economic premium principle initiated by Bühlmann (1980). The derivative 
markets in our model are over-the-counter (OTC) markets and have counterparty risks. 
We reconstruct the economic premium principle to explicitly handle the concrete form 
of the payoff function and the claim volume, and then we provide the equilibrium pricing 
rule for the OTC derivatives with the counterparty risks and the collateral agreements. We 
also demonstrate whether our pricing approach is consistent with an another equilibrium 
pricing rule in the point of the sensitivity of derivative prices.
JEL Classification: G10, G12, G13
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1. Introduction
In this article, we consider the OTC derivative pricing model with a collateral agreement. We 
especially provide a pricing rule by applying the economic premium principle. The economic 
premium principle was initiated by Bühlmann (1980) and some researchers have discussed this 
principle recently (Iwaki et al. 2001, Iwaki 2002, Karatzas and Shreve 1998 and Kijima et al. 2010). 
The concept of this pricing method is to determine the pricing kernel or state price density through 
the market equilibriums.
After the financial crisis in 2008, the counterparty risk has been in focus for many practitioners 
and researchers (Acharya and Bisin 2011, Duffie and Zhu 2011, Fujii and Takahashi 2013, Gregory 
2010 and Takino 2013a). The collateralization is one of the methods used to reduce such a risk as 
used in the money market. Recently, G20 in 2013 decided to make collateralization obligatory in 
the OTC swap market. The derivative pricing models with the collateralization have been studied 
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by some researchers. Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) examined the effects of the collateralization 
on the swap rate. They argued and showed that the collateralization increases the swap rate 
through the collateral cost. Fujii and Takahashi (2013) consider more practical model including 
the asymmetric and imperfect collateral agreement, and they showed that the derivative price is 
affected by the adjustment of the collateral cost arising from the imperfect collateral agreement. 
These pricing approaches are provided under the risk-neutral pricing method. 
An equilibrium pricing approach has been recently used to price the derivatives with collateral. 
Takino (2015b) derived the equilibrium pricing rule from the demand and supply function for 
the derivative and examined the effects of the collateralization on the derivative transactions. He 
showed that the effect of the collateralization on the option price and the swap rate are monotone 
and collateral amount increases the option price. He also argued that the impact on the swap 
rate is not significant rather than the option case because the counterparty risk bilaterally arises 
in the swap contract. The equilibrium rule in Takino (2015b) is determined by maximizing the 
investor's expected utility for her/his wealth, and then the collateralization affects the price through 
the demand and supply function influenced by the collateralization if the wealth is reflecting the 
collateral amount.
In contrast, there is the equilibrium pricing method without the demand and supply function 
in explicit. This approach was the so-called economic premium principle proposed by Bühlmann 
(1980), where the pricing kernel or state price density is determined from the market equilibrium. 
The method given by Bühlmann was extended to a multiperiod model by Iwaki et al. (2001) and 
the pricing approach, where the pricing kernel is derived from the utility maximization for the 
consumption (Iwaki 2002, Karatzas and Shreve 1998). Kijima et al. (2010) further applied this 
approach to evaluate the emission credit in the point of general equilibrium. The economic premium 
principle provides the linear pricing method like an arbitrage pricing theory. In this work, we 
consider the utility maximization problem for the wealth and the problem that explicitly treats the 
volume of the claims. We then provide the equilibrium pricing rule by determining the pricing 
kernel under the market equilibrium. This formation enables us to consider various derivative 
payoff formations, then we can construct the pricing rule that takes into account the counterparty 
risks and the collateralizations. Of course, our formula is able to accommodate the incomplete 
market models. In this study, we assume that the collateral amount is not accounted into the 
participant's  wealth to utilize the economic premium principle and to eliminate possibility of default 
for the delivery of the collateral. The agent can receive the collateral if the counterparty defaults. 
These settings enable us to identify the pricing kernel. Our pricing approach is the same as those 
provided in previous researches (Fujii and Takahashi 2013, Johannes and Sundaresan 2007) except 
that the change of measure (state price density) is given by the equilibrium criterion. Thus, our 
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study gives an another equilibrium pricing rule different from Takino (2015b), and verifies how 
the effects of the collateralization on the derivative price depend on the pricing rule included in the 
setting of the collateralization.
At this point, we have an interest in whether our equilibrium pricing rule is consistent with 
another equilibrium methods. Are the characteristics of the pricing rule given by former studies 
maintained in our approach? So, we examine the sensitivity analysis for both pricing approaches i.e., 
our formula and the pricing rule provided by Takino (2015b). As a result, we show that the effects of 
collateralization on the option price and the swap rate are almost the same as those demonstrated by 
Takino (2015b).
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: In the next section, we set the financial 
market model with the collateral agreement. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium prices for 
derivatives after determining the pricing kernel. In Section 4, we examine the sensitivity analysis of 
the derivative prices with respect to the collateral amount. Section 5 summarizes this work.
2 Model and Collateralization
2.1 Financial Markets with Counterparty Risk
There are J market participants in our financial market, and we denote the set of market 
participants by J , i.e., J = {1, 2, . . . , J }. They, respectively, invest their money in the portfolio 
consisted of the risk free asset and the risky business and also trade the derivatives. The motivation 
to enter the derivative contract is to hedge or eliminate the business risk as considered in Kijima et 
al. (2010), for instance. We denote by S jt the risky business value at time t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ) invested from 
the participant j ∈J where T denotes the maturity date of the derivatives introduced in the following. 
We assume that the risky business is traded in the large market and the agents can invest their 
money in the risky business at the unit price S jt at time t. Note that, because we examine the partial 
equilibrium for the derivative contracts in this study, we suppose that the participant j can trade S j 
only for convenience. In order to extend the general equilibrium, the assumption is eased such that 
some or all market participants are able to invest their money into other businesses. The values of 
the risky businesses are correlated with a common asset price which is assumed to be nontraded in 
the market and the price process is denoted {Yt}0≤t≤T . This assumption is one of the incomplete 
market models and the asset Y corresponds to the price indices of the stock markets, the weather or 
energy indices (e.g., Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), Cao and Wei (2004), Kijima et al., (2010), 
Lee and Oren (2009), Yamada (2007)) and so on. The market participants are also supposed to trade 
the European-type derivatives written on Y and its payoff function at maturity T is defined as follows:
H(T ) := H(T, YT ).
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We consider the call option and the swap contract and assume that those contracts are entered 
at time 0. We suppose that they behave as the price taker in the financial markets that included the 
derivative market like risky business markets. The remaining money is deposited into the bank 
account with the interest rate r (i.e., risk-free asset). The value of the bank account at time t is Bt = 
ert with B0 = 1. 
The counterparty risk in the derivative contract is the possibility that the participants fail 
to provide full payout of H(T ). We assume that the default event and payment depend on the 
counterparty’s business value at maturity as modeled by Henderson and Liang (2014). They 
modeled the counterparty risk with a so-called constructed form model as examined by Merton 
(1974). That is, the default event of agent j by 1D
j
 is represented by
1Dj = 1SjT<L
for a certain level L. The payment received by agent j ∈J is represented by ηi(SiT )H(T ) (i �= j)  when 
the counterparty i ∈ J defaults, where h
i
(・) is the recovery function for the participant i’s default. 
At this point, for the option contract, we suppose that the buyer of the option does not fail to pay the 
option fee when the contract is entered. Furthermore, there are possibilities for both counterparties 
to fail to pay for the swap contract. We express the long holder and the short holder of the 
derivatives by j = l and j = s, respectively.
2.2 Collateral Agreement
To hedge the loss due to the counterparty risk, the agent who has a positive exposure could 
receive the cash collateral from the counterparty with a negative exposure. We assume that the 
positive or negative exposure is determined at the marked-to-market (MtM) date, and the MtM is 
priced through the pricing rule, which is independent of the agent’s risk preference. We denote 
the value of the MtM at time t by Vt. If the MtM value of the derivative contract held by one market 
participant is positive, she/he could receive the collateral with the counterparty’s default. We also 
introduce the coverage ratio φ (≥ 0), and then the collateral amount is calculated by
C(φ) = φVt  (2.1)
where t means the MtM date. We finally suppose that the cash collateral is deposited into the 
account aside from the wealth accounts of the participants. This assumption implies that the 
collateralization does not affect the agent’s wealth.
2.2.1 Option Payoff with Collateral Agreement
The buyer (or long holder) of the option always has positive exposure. So she/he is entitled to 
receive the collateral at maturity when the seller of the option defaults. We set the MtM date by t = 0, 
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which is the contract date of the option. The collateral amount is then
C(φ) = φV0.
Under these conditions, we provide the payoff gopt(T) of the option subject to the collateral 
agreement at maturity. We formulate the value of g(T) from the point of the long holder, that is, 
gopt(T ) = H(T )(1− 1Ds) + (ηs(SsT )H(T ) + C(φ))1Ds  (2.2)
where 1Ds denotes the default indicator function for the option seller. The first term is the payoff of 
the option without defaults. The second term corresponds to the default payment of the option. If 
the participants default, the long holders have the default payments of ηs(SsT )H(T )  and additionally 
obtain the collateral amounts. For the short holder, the formula is given by adding minus sign to gopt.
2.2.2 Swap Payoff with Collateral Agreement
The counterparty risk arises from both sides in the swap contract unlike the option contract. 
The standard swap valuation determines the swap rate such that the present value of the contract 
equals to zero. This implies that the exposures of the derivative contract for both counterparties are 
vanished. As introduced in Johannes and Sundaresan (2003), we consider the two-period model.
We suppose that the MtM is done once for (0, T ) and the date of MtM is denoted by t ∈ (0, T).
Then, the collateral amount at the MtM date t is given by
C(φ) = φVt.
The payoff gswp(T) of this swap contract to the long holder is represented by
gswp(T ) = YT (1− 1Ds) + (ηs(SsT )YT + C(φ))1Ds −K(1− 1Dl)− (ηl(SlT )K + C(φ))1Dl .  (2.3)
We rewrite (2.3) as
gswp(T ) = gY (T )−Kg⊥(T )
where
gY (T ) = YT {1− (1− η(SsT ))1Ds}+ C(φ)(1Ds − 1Dl),  (2.4)





The long holder (short holder) receives YT (K) if the seller does not default at maturity and obtain 
ηs(SsT )YT +C(φ) (ηl(SlT )K +C(φ))  if the seller defaults. The payoff function for the short holder is 
given by adding minus sign to gswp.
2.3 Participant’s Total Wealth
We derive the equilibrium price by solving the utility maximization problem for the terminal 
wealth which is constructed with the portfolio and the derivative positions. To this end, we set the 
wealth equation for the market participant.
Agent j ∈J has the initial wealth x j0 and first allocates it to the risky business and the derivative 
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contract. The rest of the money is deposited in the bank account with a constant interest rate r. The 
money amount invested in the risky business by agent j ∈J is denoted by pj := pj(0). We assume 
that the agents do not change the position at all for (0, T]. The volume or the position of the claim 
which the participant j ∈J  is willing to trade, is denoted by δjkj (kj ≥ 0) . Where d j = 1 corresponds 
the case of the participant j = l, and d j  = －1 relates the case of j = s. Recall, l and s mean the long 
holder and the short holder, respectively. The unit price of the claim g is given by the formula
E[E(T )g(T )]  (2.5)
where E(T) is a pricing kernel or state price density at time T. We determine E through the market 
equilibrium.
The money w j0 deposited into the risk-free asset for the participant j ∈ J  at time 0 is 
wj0 = x
j
0 − πj − δjkjE[E(T )g(T )].
And the terminal wealth is given by





SjT + δjkjg(T ) = (x
j
0 − πj − δjkjE[E(T )g(T )])BT +
πj
Sj0
SjT + δjkjg(T )  (2.6)
for the claim g.
3 Equilibrium Price
In this section, we provide the pricing formula based on the economic premium principle 
(Bühlmann 1980). The pricing formula is given by (2.5), which is sufficient to determine the pricing 
kernel E.
We suppose that the preference of the market participant  j ∈J  is represented by the exponential 
utility function with the risk-averse coefficient γj , that is
Uj(x) = − 1γj e
−γjx.
We denote the inverse function of U'j by Ij , that is,
Ij(x) = (U �)−1(x).
Agent j ∈ J maximizes her/his expected utility from the terminal wealth with respect to the claim 
volume. The objective for the participant j is then given by
E[Uj(Xj(T ))] −→ maximize w.r.t. kj
where Xj is given in (2.6).
    In order to derive the market equilibrium price, we need the clearing condition.















j=1 δjkj = 0  (market clearing condition of the derivatives)
where kj ≥ 0 for all j.
Under Definition 3.1, we provide the pricing kernel.
Theorem 3.1. We suppose that our market satisfies the above assumptions and Definition 3.1. The 
terminal wealth of the participant j is given by (2.6). Under the equilibrium, the pricing kernel E is then 
given by








γj .  
Proof. The first-order condition of the utility maximization is
E[U �j(Xj(T ))g(T )] = E[U �j(Xj(T ))]E[E(T )g(T )].
From this equation, we have







where Mj is a constant. Thus it holds
(xj0 − πj − δjkE[E(T )g(T )])BT +
πj
Sj0
SjT + δjkjg(T ) = Ij(MjE(T ))  (3.2)
for j ∈J.




Ij(MjE(T )).  (3.3)
For the exponential utility case defined above, the inverse function Ij is
Ij(x) = − 1γj lnx.
(3.3) is then rewritten as
1







γj  and M¯  are constants. So we have
E(T ) = eγ(M¯−RT ).  (3.5)
Taking expectation both sides of (3.5) gives
E[E(T )] = eγM¯E[e−γRT ].
Since E[E(T )] = B−1T , the constant 
1
γ ln E(T ) = M¯ −RT  is given by
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Substituting this into (3.5) completes proof.
Theorem 3.1 with (2.5) immediately leads the equilibrium option price and swap rate respectively.
Corollar y 3.1. We suppose that there are one long holder and one short holder for the 
derivatives in our market, i.e., J = {l, s}. The equilibrium option price p(φ) with the coverage ratio 
φ is represented by
p(φ) = E[E(T )H(T ){1− (1− ηs(SsT ))1Ds}] + φV0E[E(T )1Ds ].  (3.6)
The equilibrium swap rate K(φ) with the coverage ratio φ is given by
K(φ) = E[E(T )(YT {1− (1− η(S
s
T ))1Ds}] + φE[E(T )Vt(1Ds − 1Dl))]
E[E(T ){1− (1− ηl(SlT ))1Dl}]
.  (3.7)
4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we examine the effects of the collateralization on the derivative prices through the 
sensitivity analysis.
4.1 Option Case
We first consider the effect of the counterparty risk on the option price without the collateral. 
Substituting φ = 0 into (3.6) yields the equilibrium option price p(0) without the collateral
p(0) = E[E(T )H(T ){1− (1− ηs(SsT ))1Ds}].
The option price pwoc without the counterparty risk is given by
pwoc = E[E(T )H(T )].
From the fact that
1− (1− ηs(SsT ))1Ds ≤ 1,
it holds
pwoc ≥ p(0).
Therefore, the counterparty risk decreases the option price according to the recovery rate and the 
degree of the default risk.
Next we show the impact of the collateralization on the option price. From (3.6), we have
∂p(φ)
∂φ = V0E[E(T )1Ds ] > 0.  (4.1)
(4.1) means that the option price increases with the increase of the coverage ratio. Thus, 
the collateralization increases the option price. From the above arguments, the effects of the 
collateralization on the option price are summarized as follows.
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Proposition 4.1. In the option contract, the collateralization affects the derivative price in the 
following ways:
1. The counterparty risk decreases the equilibrium option premium
2. The collateralization monotonically raises the option price
4.2 Swap Case
From (3.7), we have
∂K(φ)
∂φ =
E[E(T )Vt(1Ds − 1Dl))]
E[E(T ){1− (1− ηl(SlT ))1Dl}]
.  (4.2)
The sign of (4.2) is dependent on the difference between E[E(T )Vt1Ds ] and E[E(T )Vt1Dl ] because 
the denominator of (4.2) is a positive. However, (4.2) does not depend on the coverage ratio. This 
implies that the effect of the collateralization on the swap rate is a monotone as demonstrated by 
Takino (2015b). We also have an interest in whether our pricing approach is consistent with an 
another equilibrium pricing approaches. To check this, we consider the pricing formula of Takino 
(2015b) as an example and implement the price change. In the next section, we implement the signs 
for both formula under a certain model.
4.2.1 Numerical Result
We use the two-period multinomial tree model demonstrated by Takino (2015b), the model is 
based on Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2004).
Set two time periods t = 0, 12T, T  and suppose that the economy varies four states in a time period. Time 
t = 12T   is the MtM date. The finite probability space is defined by (Ω,F ,P)  with Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}  and 
F = 2Ω . The canonical probability measure of the state ωi (i = 1, 2, . . . , 4) is assumed
Pi := P(ωi).
The variations of prices S jt ( j = l, s) and Y are modeled by a multinomial tree model. The variation of 







ul, i = 1, 2,







us, i = 1, 4,
ds, i = 2, 3,
where Δt = 12T  and
uj = eσj
√Δt, dj = e−σj
√Δt
for j = l, s. And, the variation of Y is given by






uY , i = 1, 3,
dY , i = 2, 4
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where
uY = eσY
√Δt, dY = e−σY
√Δt.
Next, we set the default events and the recovery rate. We use the constructed model to model the 
default event, that is, there exists threshold Lj(> 0) ( j = l, s), the agent fails to provide full payment 
of the claim if the terminal business value S jT  is less than Lj . Then, the default indicator function is 
represented by
1Dj = 1SjT<Lj
for j = l, s. We also assume Sj0d2j < Lj (j = l, s) .  The recovery rate is defined by
η(SjT ) = ηj
SjT
Lj
where ηj ∈ [0, 1] is a constant for j = l, s.
The MtM for the swap contract is priced by the arbitrage pricing method. The risk-neutral 










where Qi := Q(ωi)  ( i = 1, 2, . . . , 4), we obtain the marginal probability
Q := Q1 +Q3 = BΔt − dYuY − dY .
We use the parameters used in Takino (2015b), and these are as follows: P2 = 0.15, P3 = 0.05, S l0 
= 100.0, σl = 0.1, γl = 0.0002, S
s
0 = 100.0, σs= 0.4, γs = 0.0001, πl =－154048.32, πs = 26590.17, Y0 
= 100.0, σY = 0.2,  ηl = 0.5, Ll = 90.0, η s = 0.5, Ls = 90.0, r = rc = 0.05 and T = 1.0. We implement for 
various P4 such that
P1 = 1− (P2 + P3 + P4).  (4.3)
Under this parameter set, we implement the sensitivity to the swap rate of the collateral amount 
i.e., ∂K(φ)/∂φ   for both pricing formulae. We calculate ∂K(φ)/∂φ  for the pricing rule of (2015b) and 
E[E(T )Vt(1Ds − 1Dl)] for our work. Note that, it is sufficient to check E[e−γRT Vt(1Ds − 1Dl)]  only since 
E[e−γRT ]  is a constant. The result is presented in Table 1. The column of Takino (2015b) expresses the value 
of ∂K∗/∂φ  for the formula given in Takino (2015b). The column of EPP presents the value of 
E[e−γRT Vt(1Ds − 1Dl)] .  From the table, we observe that signs of both models almost are equal. Therefore, 




In this article, we have constructed an equilibrium pricing method for the pricing of the OTC 
derivatives with the collateralizations, and then have investigated the effects of collateralization 
on the derivative prices through examining the sensitivity analyses of derivative prices to the 
collateral amount. We especially examined whether the sensitivity results for our pricing rule have 
the same as those provided by the previous research. While the equilibrium pricing rule based on 
the demand and supply function has been used by some researchers, our study constructed an 
equilibrium pricing criterion based on the economic premium principle and provided the pricing 
rule with the pricing kernel. For the option contract case, we showed that the collateral amount 
monotonically increases the option price as shown in the previous research. For the swap contract 
case, our numerical results demonstrated that the sensitivities of the swap rate to the collateral 
amount under various parameters almost equal to those for previous approach. Therefore, our 
research showed that we are able to use different equilibrium pricing approaches to investigate the 
effect of collateralization on the derivative prices.
P4 Takino (2015b) EPP
0.00 0.6324 0.0000
0.05 0.2459 0.0001
0.10 - 0.0182 - 0.0002
0.15 - 0.2456 - 0.0097
0.20 - 0.4524 - 0.0524
0.25 - 0.6429 - 0.1686
0.30 - 0.8179 - 0.4222
0.35 - 0.9770 - 0.9205
0.40 - 1.1190 - 1.8605
0.45 - 1.2423 - 3.6364
0.50 - 1.3451 - 7.1177
0.55 - 1.4252 - 14.4509
0.60 - 1.4801 - 31.7709
0.65 - 1.5071 - 80.4210
0.70 - 1.5024 - 258.5313
0.75 - 1.4605 - 1243.5795
0.80 - 1.3715 - 9541.5459
Table 1: Sensitivity of swap rate for change in coverage ratio φ. The column of Takino (2015b) 
expresses the value of ∂K∗/∂φ  for the formula given in Takino (2015b). The column of EPP 
presents the value of E[e−γRT Vt(1Ds − 1Dl)] .
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